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Mindfulness originated in the Buddhist tradition as a way of cultivating clarity of
thought. Despite the fact that this behavior is best captured using critical thinking
(CT) assessments, no studies have examined the effects of mindfulness on CT or
the mechanisms underlying any such possible relationship. Even so, mindfulness has
been suggested as being beneficial for CT in higher education. CT is recognized as
an important higher-order cognitive process which involves the ability to analyze and
evaluate evidence and arguments. Such non-automatic, reflective responses generally
require the engagement of executive functioning (EF) which includes updating, inhibition,
and shifting of representations in working memory. Based on research showing that
mindfulness enhances aspects of EF and certain higher-order cognitive processes,
we hypothesized that individuals higher in facets of dispositional mindfulness would
demonstrate greater CT performance, and that this relationship would be mediated
by EF. Cross-sectional assessment of these constructs in a sample of 178 university
students was achieved using the observing and non-reactivity sub-scales of the Five
Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire, a battery of EF tasks and the Halpern Critical Thinking
Assessment. Our hypotheses were tested by constructing a multiple meditation model
which was analyzed using Structural Equation Modeling. Evidence was found for
inhibition mediating the relationships between both observing and non-reactivity and CT
in different ways. Indirect-only (or full) mediation was demonstrated for the relationship
between observing, inhibition, and CT. Competitive mediation was demonstrated for
the relationship between non-reactivity, inhibition, and CT. This suggests additional
mediators of the relationship between non-reactivity and CT which are not accounted for
in this model and have a negative effect on CT in addition to the positive effect mediated
by inhibition. These findings are discussed in the context of the Default Interventionist
Dual Process Theory of Higher-order Cognition and previous studies on mindfulness,
self-regulation, EF, and higher-order cognition. In summary, dispositional mindfulness
appears to facilitate CT performance and this effect is mediated by the inhibition
component of EF. However, this relationship is not straightforward which suggests many
possibilities for future research.
Keywords: self-regulation, higher-order cognition, dispositional mindfulness, dual-process theory, critical
thinking
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INTRODUCTION
Despite its origins as a way of cultivating clarity of thought,
among the collection of studies on mindfulness conducted
in recent years, few have been concerned with the link
between mindfulness and thinking skills in typically developing
individuals. Assessments that attempt to capture the thinking
skills of people in real-world situations can be found in the body
of literature focused on critical thinking (CT; Ku, 2009; Butler,
2012). CT is recognized as an important higher-order cognitive
process which involves the ability to analyze and evaluate
evidence and arguments without bias from experience and prior
knowledge. The application of CT requires a non-automatic
response to a problem situation in order to avoid heuristic
and biased thinking (West et al., 2008). Such non-automatic,
critical, and reﬂective responses generally require the engagement
of executive functioning (EF) – monitoring, updating, and
switching between representations in working memory – and are
regarded as involving deliberative processes, generally referred
to as Type 2 processes by Dual-Processing theorists (Evans and
Stanovich, 2013). Mindfulness is often described as a process
consisting of two components: present-moment attentional
focus coupled with non-reactive monitoring of one’s ongoing
experience (Bishop et al., 2004). While an emerging body of
theoretical and empirical work has linked mindfulness with
enhanced EF (Chambers et al., 2007; Josefsson and Broberg,
2011; Tang et al., 2012; Teper and Inzlicht, 2013), little empirical
work has been carried out on the relationship between EF
and CT (Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga et al., 2012). Furthermore,
though mindfulness has been shown to facilitate certain types
of higher-order cognition, including insight problem-solving
(Ostaﬁn and Kassman, 2012; Wen et al., 2013), moral reasoning
and ethical decision-making (Cottone and Javier, 2007; Ruedy
and Schweitzer, 2011; Shapiro et al., 2012), the relationship
between mindfulness and CT has not been investigated. In light
of these identiﬁed gaps in the literature, the current study sought
to investigate the relationship between dispositional mindfulness,
EF, and CT skills.
Though there is overwhelming consensus that CT skills should
be cultivated in educational and occupational settings, attempts
to converge on an operational deﬁnition of CT have been
far from unanimous (Dwyer et al., 2014). Common to most
conceptualisations of CT is the ability to evaluate arguments
and evidence without inﬂuence from one’s own prior belief
and experience (West et al., 2008). One inﬂuential deﬁnition
proposes that CT involves the application of particular cognitive
skills including analysis, evaluation, and inference skills, in a
purposeful, reasoned, and goal-directed manner (Halpern, 1998;
Facione, 2013). It has been demonstrated that the appropriate
execution of these CT skills is inﬂuenced by the presence of
speciﬁc dispositions toward thinking, including a disposition
toward truth-seeking, openmindedness, prudence, diligence, and
ﬂexibility (Facione, 2013; Dwyer et al., 2014). CT performance
also depends on a person’s awareness that a particular thinking
skill is required, that the ongoing execution of the skill is
adequate, and the ability to monitor and exert control over
thinking processes (Halpern, 1998). Together, these have been
referred to as the self-regulatory functions of metacognition
(Halpern, 1998; Ku and Ho, 2010; Dwyer et al., 2014). Studies
focusing on both the direct assessment of CT and the avoidance
of heuristic and biased thinking have shown that the ability
to monitor and control ongoing thought processes results in
better real-world outcomes (Butler, 2012; Butler et al., 2012),
particularly whenmaking decisions in personal, professional, and
legislative domains (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; Hastie and
Dawes, 2001; Myers, 2002; Hilton, 2003; Sunstein, 2005; Baron
et al., 2006; Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006; Reyna and Farley,
2006; Reyna and Lloyd, 2006). Few studies have examined the
real-world cognitive outcomes of mindfulness though one study
did show that dispositional mindfulness was related to fewer
experiences of cognitive failures in daily life (Herndon, 2008).
This study examines a possible link between dispositional
mindfulness and CT. However, there are at least two competing
views as to how mindfulness might relate to CT. One view
suggests that mindfulness is either not related to CT or even a
hindrance to eﬀective CT due to its association with acceptance
and non-elaborative, or non-reactive processing (Brendel, 2015).
Another view suggests that mindfulness facilitates eﬀective CT
due to its association with improved self-regulation (Shapiro
et al., 2011). In light of an emerging body of research
demonstrating a positive relationship between mindfulness, self-
regulation, and EF we propose that the latter view may be
true. However, a link between mindfulness and CT has not
been established in the literature and this may depend on a
range of factors including the form of mindfulness investigated,
the particular CT skill assessed, and the characteristics of
study participants. The current study focused on younger
adults and examined the relationship between dispositional
mindfulness as measured using a short form of the Five
Factor mindfulness Questionnaire (Bohlmeijer et al., 2011) and
CT performance assessed using the Halpern Critical Thinking
Assessment (Halpern, 2010). Though the relationship between
dispositional mindfulness and CT has not been directly assessed
yet, a positive relationship between dispositional mindfulness
and related constructs such as ethical decision-making, insight
problem-solving and creative thinking has been demonstrated
(Ruedy and Schweitzer, 2011; Ostaﬁn and Kassman, 2012; Baas
et al., 2014). Dispositional mindfulness has also been found to
be negatively correlated with engagement in intuitive thinking
(Remmers et al., 2014). In light of recent research suggesting a
link between mindfulness, self-regulation, and EF (Feltman et al.,
2009; Tang and Posner, 2009; Sahdra et al., 2011; Moore et al.,
2012; Lyvers et al., 2013; Morgan et al., 2013; Ostaﬁn et al., 2013a)
and work suggesting a link between self-regulation, EF, and CT
performance (West et al., 2008; Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga et al.,
2012; Evans and Stanovich, 2013; Dwyer et al., 2014), the current
study sought to investigate whether the relationship between
dispositional mindfulness and CT performance is mediated by EF
performance.
The link between mindfulness and self-regulatory processes
can best be explored by considering the currently most
highly endorsed operational deﬁnition of mindfulness which
conceptualizes mindfulness as consisting of two components
which pertain to the focus and quality of attention, respectively,
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i.e., present-moment attentional focus coupled with non-reactive
monitoring of one’s ongoing experience (Bishop et al., 2004). This
study focuses on dispositional mindfulness, a construct which
reﬂects the tendency to engage in this non-reactive, present-
moment attention (Brown and Ryan, 2003). Early teachings on
mindfulness suggested that a dispositional tendency to engage in
mindful attention is an innate trait as well as something which can
be trained (Rau and Williams, 2015). Dispositional mindfulness
is considered to be stable over time but can be modiﬁed
through certain meditative practices, for example, practices
involving Focused Attention and Open Monitoring (Davidson
and Kaszniak, 2015; Kiken et al., 2015), integrative mind-body
practices such as yoga, tai chi and qigong (Schure et al., 2008;
Caldwell et al., 2010) and particular exercises developed within
the traditions of Dialectical Behavior Therapy (Perroud et al.,
2012) and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (Ciarrochi
et al., 2010). Recent research has shown that over the course
of a mindfulness-based meditation training program individual
trajectories of change in the ability to engage a mindful state is
associated with both increases in dispositional mindfulness and
psychological health (Kiken et al., 2015). This adds to research
demonstrating associations between dispositional mindfulness
in non-meditators and adaptive outcomes such as increased
life satisfaction (Kong et al., 2014), better emotional regulation
(Goodall et al., 2012), lower depression and anxiety symptoms
(Desrosiers et al., 2013), less negative and more positive aﬀect
(Short et al., 2015), and increased self-esteem (Rasmussen and
Pidgeon, 2011). It is also consistent with studies on mindfulness-
based interventions that demonstrated increases in dispositional
mindfulness which correlated with psychological health beneﬁts
(Kiken et al., 2015). A range of measures have been developed
to assess dispositional mindfulness and across these the two-
factor structure of mindfulness tends to be supported (Rau and
Williams, 2015).
The ﬁrst component of mindfulness involves present-moment
attentional focus. When attention is focused on the present
moment, internal and external stimuli are observed and brought
into awareness. This allows aﬀective cues which are normally
overlooked to be noticed. It has been suggested that one function
of such aﬀective cues is to indicate that the current state an
individual is in is inconsistent with their goal state and therefore
control needs to be exerted – a process sometimes referred to
as conﬂict monitoring (Teper et al., 2013). Enhanced present-
moment awareness and conﬂict monitoring has been associated
with greater sensitivity to perceptual cues (Anicha et al., 2011;
Teper and Inzlicht, 2013; Teper et al., 2013) and enhanced
executive control skills, including the ability to update and switch
between thought-action representations in working memory
(Bishop et al., 2004; Moore and Malinowski, 2009).
Non-reactivity – the second component of mindfulness –
involves executive control to inhibit elaboration and/or
suppression of aﬀective cues. This allows for the early
engagement of emotion regulation before intense emotional
reactivity to the attended thoughts, feelings, and sensations
can occur (Teper et al., 2013). Notably, research suggests
that the two component skills of present-moment awareness
and non-reactivity follow distinct developmental trajectories
which may vary across individuals (Lilja et al., 2012). These
developmental trajectories can be tracked using validated
self-report questionnaires which assess the components of
dispositional mindfulness such as the extensively used Five
Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire employed in this study (Sauer
et al., 2013). These questionnaires can also reveal the extent
to which those without mindfulness training tend to engage
mindful attention (Brown and Ryan, 2003).
As such, the predominant two-component operationalisation
of mindfulness implies both monitoring and control, skills which
are inherently self-regulatory (Bishop et al., 2004). Importantly,
evidence for improved self-regulation of behavior as a result
of mindfulness comes from studies on healthy eating (Jordan
et al., 2014), procrastination (Sirois and Tosti, 2012), smoking
cessation (Libby et al., 2012), persistence (Evans et al., 2009), and
alcohol intake (Ostaﬁn et al., 2012). Furthermore, evidence for
improved self-regulation of emotions and thoughts comes from
the extensive literature on the clinical beneﬁts of mindfulness
(Dowd et al., 2015; See reviews by Baer, 2003; Hofmann et al.,
2010; Veehof et al., 2011), which has reported reductions in
anxiety, depression, pain interference, and catastrophic thinking
as a result of mindfulness training.
In cognitive models of self-regulation, the mobilization of self-
regulatory resources is characterized by the eﬀective operation
of the EFs that support and govern working memory. Although
many models of EF have been developed, there is an emerging
consensus that EF involves three basic processes: updating,
inhibition, and shifting. Updating refers to the active revision
and monitoring of thinking; shifting refers to switching between
tasks or mental sets; and inhibition refers to the active, deliberate
suppression of thoughts or responses and the maintenance of
attention on goal-relevant information (Miyake et al., 2000;
Miyake and Friedman, 2012). The updating and maintenance of
working memory is vital for the accurate active representation
of goals and goal-related information (Hofmann et al., 2012).
Furthermore, greater working memory capacity protects goal
representations from thought intrusions and decreases mind-
wandering. This is often referred to as goal shielding (Brewin
and Smart, 2005). Greater inhibitory control has been linked to
more successful goal shielding and self-regulation in behaviors
ranging from eating behavior to sexual ﬁdelity (Hofmann et al.,
2008; Nederkoorn et al., 2010; Pronk et al., 2011). More generally,
EFs support the coordination of thoughts and actions in a goal-
directed manner and are essential for success in education, work,
and everyday living (Hofmann et al., 2012).
Research also suggest that the EF processes of updating,
inhibition, and shifting support higher-order processes involved
in problem-solving (Burton et al., 2006), metacognition
(Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000), and decision-making (Del
Missier et al., 2010). EFs are particularly important in situations
or tasks which are novel or where learned automatic responses
are not adaptive and therefore additional control is required
(Hofmann et al., 2012). Situations requiring CT fulﬁll these
criteria and EFs may be important to sustain ongoing eﬀorts at
CT. Furthermore, mindfulness may support EFs (Chiesa et al.,
2011). Considering the operational deﬁnition of mindfulness,
which involves present-moment awareness and non-reactivity,
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we propose a relationship between components of mindfulness
and component EFs. The sustained attention to present-moment
experience developed through mindfulness practice likely
requires the ability to switch attention between stimuli in
current experience and back to current experience when the
mind wanders (Bishop et al., 2004). In the language of working
memory theory, this implies continuous updating of the thought-
action representations which make up the contents of working
memory as current experience changes and shifting between
these thought-action representations (Teper and Inzlicht, 2013).
Engaging this present-moment attention in a non-reactive
manner then requires the inhibition of elaborative processing
of such representations (Hayes and Shenk, 2004; Holas and
Jankowski, 2012). Recent research has shown that EF mediates
the relationship between mindfulness and positive and negative
aﬀect (Short et al., 2015) but no studies have examined the
indirect eﬀects of speciﬁc mindfulness facets through speciﬁc
components of EF on outcomes usually associated with CT
ability.
A number of studies have reported direct eﬀects of
mindfulness on speciﬁc components of EF. For example, several
studies show a positive eﬀect of mindfulness practice on the
ability to inhibit automatic responses.Mindfulness practice over a
6 weeks period improved performance on a backward inhibition
task (Greenberg et al., 2012a) and eight sessions of mindfulness-
based cognitive therapy improved performance on the Hayling
task (Heeren et al., 2009) – measures which are commonly
used to assess inhibition. Studies employing the Stroop task
have found better performance in experienced meditators than
novices (Chan andWoollacott, 2007), after a 15 min mindfulness
meditation (Wenk-Sormaz, 2005) and following a 6-weeks
mindfulness training (Allen et al., 2012). However, one study
reported no improvement in Stroop performance after an
8-weeks mindfulness-based stress reduction program (MBSR;
Anderson et al., 2007).
Studies have also reported a positive link between mindfulness
and the ability to switch between thought-action representations
in working memory. Chambers et al. (2007) examined the
eﬀects of self-reported increases in mindfulness following a
10-days mindfulness retreat and found that improvement in
switching performance was signiﬁcantly correlated with increases
in the tendency to employ mindful attention. Relative to a
control condition, this experimental group showed improvement
on the Internal Switching task, which measures switching
between positive and negative aﬀective words (Chambers et al.,
2007). Using the Attention Network Task, Jha et al. (2007)
found that relative to controls, participants in a MBSR course
showed improved attention switching ability. In another study
by Hodgins and Adair (2010), participants in a mindfulness
training group performed better than controls on a task
requiring participants to switch between visual perspectives.
However, null eﬀects have been reported in other studies. For
example, Lykins et al. (2010) found no diﬀerences between
novice and experienced meditators on the Color Trails test,
and Anderson et al. (2007) found no change in performance
on an attention switching task after an 8-weeks MBSR
course.
Though no studies have examined the eﬀects of mindfulness
practice on working memory updating speciﬁcally, the eﬀects of
mindfulness on working memory capacity has been examined.
One study reported that, after a 10-days mindfulness retreat,
working memory capacity improved in a mindfulness group
compared to a waitlist control-group (Chambers et al., 2007).
Also, in a study that compared mindfulness training with
an active control-group, working memory capacity showed
improvement in the mindfulness group indexed by both the
forward/backward digit span of the WAIS and the n-back task
(Zeidan et al., 2010). Furthermore, in a military group prior
to deployment, the deleterious eﬀects of stress on working
memory capacity were buﬀered against for those participants
who reported high levels of mindfulness practice during an
intervention (Jha et al., 2010).
Having presented evidence for the claim that mindfulness
broadly supports self-regulation and that a key mechanism
underlying this eﬀect may be the enhancement of EF, the link
between self-regulatory processes, EFs, and CT will now be
discussed. In doing so, it is useful to consider dual processing
accounts of higher-order cognition as a useful theoretical
framework which can integrate the ﬁndings discussed in previous
sections. In these accounts, researchers have proposed that two
separate cognitive systems are available to us when higher-
order cognition such as judgment, reasoning, decision-making
or problem-solving is to be carried out (Evans, 2003, 2011;
Kahneman, 2011; Evans and Stanovich, 2013). Indeed, Hart et al.
(2013) suggested Kahneman’s (2011) description of dual-process
theory as a framework for explaining the cognitive beneﬁts
of mindfulness interventions. They suggested that mindfulness
prompts the self-regulation of attention which activates system
2 or reﬂective thinking. However, the Default-interventionist
dual process theory of higher-order cognition may oﬀer a more
reﬁned view as it speciﬁes the mechanisms by which this self-
regulation occurs and the conditions under which it will lead
to an optimal response (Evans and Stanovich, 2013). This
particular theory suggests that higher-order cognition, such as
eﬀective CT, requires inhibition of default Type 1 processes,
which by deﬁnition exert minimal working memory load and
occur automatically in response to stimuli (West et al., 2008).
It is assumed that CT skills involve working memory driven
Type 2 processes, which are typically slow, limited in capacity,
conscious, and controlled. These Type 2 processes will be most
eﬀective when working memory is being updated eﬃciently
as new information arises. However, exactly how EF relates
to CT has not been investigated empirically (Sanz de Acedo
Lizarraga et al., 2012). As noted above, mindfulness facilitates the
executive mechanisms of working memory which are critical to
engaging Type 2 processes. Furthermore, mindfulness training
does appear to be beneﬁcial for other higher-order thinking
skills which may also depend on EF such as insight problem-
solving (Ostaﬁn and Kassman, 2012; Wen et al., 2013), moral
reasoning and ethical decision-making (Cottone and Javier,
2007; Ruedy and Schweitzer, 2011; Shapiro et al., 2012). Each
of these studies emphasized the non-automatic orientation to
experience that mindfulness brings and which is characteristic of
the engagement of EF and Type-2 processing but they did not
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examine whether EF mediated the eﬀect of mindfulness on these
cognitive outcomes. Therefore, we hypothesize that mindfulness
may facilitate CT skills, and engagement of Type 2 processing in
general, via enhancement of the EFs governing working memory.
We explore this possibility by testing whether EF mediates the
relationship between mindfulness and CT.
In light of the available evidence, several more speciﬁc
predictions can be made about how components of mindfulness,
EF, and CT are related. The current study adopted a multiple
indicator individual diﬀerences study approach to test the
following hypotheses using structural equation modeling (SEM):
1. First, it is hypothesized that the measurement model
for mindfulness will support the two-component
conceptualisation of mindfulness with observing representing
present-moment awareness and non-reactivity representing
non-reactive monitoring of one’s ongoing experience.
2. Second, it is hypothesized that the measurement model for
EF will support the three-component unity/diversity model
which proposes that updating, inhibition, and shifting are
related but distinct components of EF.
3. Third, it is hypothesized that present-moment awareness
and non-reactivity will be positively associated with CT
performance. Notably, present-moment mindful awareness,
often referred to as observing, has been associated with an
enhanced ability to pick up relevant information (Carson
and Langer, 2006), whereas non-reactivity has been shown
to interrupt the biasing of information processing by both
emotional state (Kiken and Shook, 2011) and temperament
(Feltman et al., 2009). Using appropriate information free
from bias is vital for eﬀective CT (West et al., 2008).
Therefore, we predict that higher scores on self-reported
measures of both observing and non-reactivity will predict
higher CT performance.
4. Fourth, it is hypothesized that self-reported observing or
present-moment awareness will be positively related to the
ability to (a) update the contents of working memory, (b)
shift between diﬀerent working memory representations, and
(c) inhibit prepotent responses. Notably, previous research
has linked greater skills of observation with better inhibitory
control performance (Schmertz et al., 2009) and with better
performance on tasks requiring participants to switch ﬂexibly
from one thought to another (Chambers et al., 2007).
Higher self-reported observation skills has also been found to
predict better performance on measures of working memory
updating (Anicha et al., 2011).
5. Fifth, it is expected that non-reactivity will be positively
related to inhibition and shifting. Non-reactivity has been
associated with both behavioral and electrophysiological
indicators of inhibition (Teper and Inzlicht, 2013) and greater
cognitive ﬂexibility (Anicha et al., 2011).
6. Sixth, it is expected that updating, shifting, and inhibition will
be positively related to CT. CT may be most eﬀective when
information held in working memory is eﬃciently updated
as new information is presented, when switching from one
perspective to another is eﬃcient, and when heuristic and
biased responses and distractions are inhibited (West et al.,
2008; Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga et al., 2012).
7. Finally, it is expected that the relationship between
mindfulness and CT will be mediated by EF. To date
no research has investigated the mechanisms by which
mindfulness facilitates higher-order thinking skills. In light
of theoretical work in the dual-processing tradition and
research on mindfulness, self-regulation and higher-order
thinking skills, we propose EF as a key mechanism driving
this relationship. Establishing a mediational relationship
between mindfulness, EF, and CT is necessary in order
to support this proposition that the application of EF is
a mechanism through which mindfulness facilitates CT
performance (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Ostaﬁn et al., 2013b).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
One hundred and seventy eight university undergraduate
psychology students (Mean age= 21.04; SD= 5.77; 39 males; 139
females) attending the National University of Ireland, Galway,
participated in the study. A priori calculations using Soper’s
(2015) SEM sample size calculator suggested a minimum sample
size of 156 was required for analysis to yield adequate power.
This was based on a small-medium anticipated eﬀect size (0.2),
six latent predictor variables, 20 observed variables and a desired
power level of 0.8 at a probability level of 0.05. Participants were
recruited by e-mail and an online participant recruitment system.
They were awarded credit as part of their course requirement.
Participant were over 18 and were required to have English as
their ﬁrst language or university level English (i.e., equivalent
to 80 on TOEFL or 6.5 on IELTS; both are recognized tests of
English as a foreign language). Exclusion criteria included those
with alcohol and drug dependency (including prescribed sedation
medications) and those with visual and hearing impairments not
corrected to normal (as required for the computer tasks). This
study was given ethical approval by the NUIG Research Ethics
Committee.
Study Design
The study employed a cross-sectional, individual diﬀerences
design to examine the relationships between the observing
and non-reactivity components of mindfulness, the updating,
shifting, and inhibition components of EF and CT skills. SEMwas
used to test the model of speciﬁed relations between mindfulness,
EF, and CT. SEM allows for multiple hypotheses to be tested
simultaneously. SEM is best suited to test hypotheses patterns
of direct and indirect relationships between theoretical concepts
which contain observed and latent variables (MacCallum and
Austin, 2000). In assessing EF, a latent variable approach (LVA)
is best as it resolves the task impurity problem. This is a problem
inherent in using individual EF tasks where non-executive
processes contaminate the examination of executive processes
(Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake and Friedman, 2012). LVA allows
identiﬁcation of how performance on multiple exemplar tasks is
statistically shared (in this case the executive process), thus giving
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a truer measure of the construct underlying these tasks which
can then be related to a target manifest variable, in this case CT
(Del Missier et al., 2010). This means that two tasks for each of
updating, switching, and inhibition were used in this study in
order to compute latent variables for each EF. This approach has
been used to investigate the role of in EF in decision-making (Del
Missier et al., 2010), ﬂuid intelligence (Friedman et al., 2006), and
attentional diﬃculties (Friedman et al., 2007).
Apparatus and Materials
All computer tasks were conducted on a Dell computer with a
15 in LCD monitor. The EF tasks were administered using the
MATLAB software program which recorded reaction times and
error commission.
Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire Short Form
(FFMQ-SF; Bohlmeijer et al., 2011)
The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire Short Form (FFMQ-
SF) is a 24 items measure consisting of ﬁve subscales
(observing, describing, acting with awareness, non-judging of
inner experience, and non-reactivity to inner experience). The
FFQM-SF employs a ﬁve-point Likert scale (e.g., 1 = never
or very rarely true; 5 = very often or always true). For the
purpose of the current study, the scores obtained for the
observing and non-reactivity facets were the main focus. This
multi-facet scale includes four observing items (e.g., “I pay
attention to sounds, such as clocks ticking, birds chirping, or
cars passing”) and ﬁve non-reactivity items (e.g., “I perceive my
feelings and emotions without having to react to them”). The
current study used non-reactivity and observing sub-scales to
measure mindfulness, as these are the most widely agreed upon
components of mindfulness analyzed in the empirical literature
(Anicha et al., 2011). The non-reactivity sub-scale showed good
reliability (α = 0.72) as did the observing sub-scale (α = 0.71).
Executive Functions Measures
Six executive tasks were administered to all participants to
assess the three core components of EFs; Shifting, Updating,
and Inhibition. For all tasks, participants were asked to respond
as quickly and accurately as possible. The dependent variables
for each task were the proportions of accurate responses. We
followed Miyake et al. (2000) in using these dependent measures
for all but the switching tasks. While switch costs are often
examined in terms of reaction time, it is not uncommon to
examine accuracy costs in terms of the proportion of accurate
responses on switch trials (Sy et al., 2013). This method was
chosen to avoid any potentially unique variance that could be
attributed to reaction time and in light of evidence that reaction
time switch costs do not reﬂect executive processes (Logan and
Bundesen, 2003).
The following two tasks were used to measure Shifting:
Plus–minus task
The plus–minus task (Jersild, 1927; Spector and Biederman,
1976 adapted by Miyake et al., 2000) consists of three blocks
in which 30 two-digit numbers are presented. In the ﬁrst block
participants are required to add 3 to each number. In the second
block they are required to subtract 3 from each number. In the
ﬁnal block participant are required to alternate between adding
3 and subtracting 3 from each number (i.e., add 3 from the
ﬁrst number, subtract 3 from the next number and so forth).
The proportion of accurate responses on switch trials was the
dependent variable.
Number–letter task
The number–letter task (Miyake et al., 2000) is presented in
three blocks. In the ﬁrst block (32 trials) number–letter pairs
are presented in the top two quadrants of a square grid on
a computer screen. The participant is instructed to indicate
whether the number is odd or even. In the second block (32 trials)
the number–letter pair is presented in the bottom quadrants of
the grid. In this block the participants are instructed to indicate
whether a letter is vowel or consonant. In the ﬁnal block number–
letter pairs are presented in all quadrants of the grid. When
they appear in the top quadrants, participants have to indicate
whether the number is odd or even, and when they appeared in
the bottom quadrants they had to indicate if a letter is a vowel or a
consonant. Therefore in the third block, half of the trails require
the participant to shift between the two types of categorisation.
The dependent measure was the proportion of accurate responses
on switch trials.
The following two tasks were used to measure Updating:
Tone monitoring task
In the tone monitoring task (Miyake et al., 2000) participants
are presented with 25 tones of low, middle, and high frequency
which are delivered over four trial blocks. The tones are presented
for 500 ms each with an interval of 2500 ms. Each trial block
consist of eight high-pitched tones (880 Hz), eight medium-
pitched tones (440 Hz) and eight low- pitched tones (220 Hz),
with the addition of 1 tone selected randomly from the other
three for a total of 25. There were four blocks and six potential
correct answers per block. Whenever one of the tones was
played for the fourth time, the participant had to respond by
pressing the corresponding key – 1 for low, 2 for medium,
and 3 for high – while maintaining a count of the occurrences
of the other tones in working memory. In order to avoid
the impact of momentary mental lapse on task performance
the tone count for each pitch automatically resets to 0 after
incorrect responses. A diﬀerent error tone would be heard on
this occurrence. The dependent measure was the proportion of
correct responses.
Letter-memory task
The letter-memory task (Miyake et al., 2000) involves constantly
updating a series of letters in working memory. A series of letters
are presented in succession in each trial for the duration of
2000 ms per letter. Participants are required rehearse the last
four letters presented in the list, and then report the last four
letters in the series at the end of each trial. The number of
letters presented (5, 7, 9, or 11) varied randomly across trials to
avoid habituation to trial length. The dependent measure is the
proportion of correctly recalled letters.
The following two tasks were used to measure Inhibition:
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Anti-saccade task
The anti-saccade task (Kane et al., 2001) requires participants
to detect a sudden-onset visual cue and use that cue to direct
their attention to a speciﬁc location that will contain a target
stimulus. In the ﬁrst block the cue appears in the same location
as the target. In the second block the cue appears on the opposite
side to the target. In this block when the cue predictably signals
a location that does not contain the target, participants must
voluntarily redirect their gaze from the cue to the target, ignoring
the salient cue, and respond to the target. Participant must
therefore maintain their goal (i.e., response to target) despite
interference. The dependent measure was the proportion of
correctly identiﬁed targets.
Stop-signal task
The stop-signal task (Miyake et al., 2000) requires inhibition of
a learned response. This task is presented in two blocks. In the
ﬁrst block participants are presented with 24 words one-by-one
(e.g., duck, gun), they are instructed to indicate if the word was
an animal or not by means of button presses (i.e., left = animal,
right = not). In the second block participants were instructed
not to respond when they heard a tone. If no tone was played
they were required to respond as they did in the ﬁrst block. In
all trials a ﬁxation point appears on the screen 500 ms prior to
the presentation of the stimulus and participants are given up to
1500 ms to make their response. The dependent measure was the
proportion of correctly withheld responses for the stop trials.
Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment (Halpern, 2010)
The Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment (HCTA) assesses
thinking in everyday, easy to relate to scenarios. It taps both
the motivational and behavioral parts of CT by including both
open-ended and multiple choice questions (Ku, 2009). The
assessment consists of 25 everyday situations that the participant
must analyze and critique. Following these situations are 25
open-ended questions followed by 25 speciﬁc questions that
assess the reasoning behind each answer. Across these questions
ﬁve sub-categories of thinking skills must be applied including
argument analysis skills, verbal reasoning skills, hypothesis
testing skills, likelihood and uncertainty judgment skills and
decision making/problem solving skills. There are ﬁve items for
each sub-category of CT with the maximum points possible for
each sub-category varying. Scoring of the HCTA was carried out
by three trained graders. The scoring guide provides answers for
forced-choice questions while open-ended questions are graded
according to speciﬁc grading prompts (for more detail see Dwyer
et al., 2012). Greater scores are awarded to more accurate and
comprehensive answers and total scores can range from 0 to 194
(Halpern, 2010). The internal reliability of the HTCA was found
to be adequate with a Cronbach’s alpha coeﬃcient of 0.79 in
this study which corresponds to robust reliability found in other
samples (Halpern, 2010; Dwyer et al., 2012).
Procedure
All participants ﬁrst completed the HCTA and the FFMQ-SF
questionnaire online (along with other measures not pertinent
to this study) at a separate location (e.g., home or campus
computers). The online questionnaires were administered using
Survey Gizmo. At a later date, within a month of online testing,
all participants were administered six computerized EF tasks
in a laboratory cubicle at the School of Psychology building
at NUI Galway. Here, participant consent was again obtained
(following provision of informed consent online). A pseudo-
random counterbalancing strategy was applied to the task order,
involving six orders with no two orders repeating the order of
consecutive pairs of tasks. This would have kept any EF depletion
or fatigue eﬀects constant across tasks and participants. At the
end of each task participants were prompted to call the researcher,
the researcher then applied the speciﬁed order when initiating
the next task. The laboratory session took approximately 1 h to
complete for each participant.
Analytic Approach
The approach to analysis consisted of four stages. First, a series
of measurement models were used to evaluate the mindfulness
and EF constructs. Second, a structural model of EF and CT was
evaluated. Third, a structural model of dispositional mindfulness,
EF, and CT was evaluated based on the structural model
established in the second stage. Finally, a multiple mediator
analysis was carried out by examining the direct and indirect
eﬀects between the mindfulness factors of Observing and Non-
reactivity, the EF factors of Updating, Inhibition and Shifting
and CT in order to determine the nature of any mediation/non-
mediation present.
RESULTS
A summary of the descriptive statistics for variables representing
mindfulness, EF, and CT performance can be seen in Table 1
along with correlations between them. Most variables had
relatively low values for skewness and kurtosis except for the
Number–Letter, Letter Memory, and Anti-saccade tasks. Arc Sin
transformations, which are often employed with proportional
measures, were successful in achieving acceptable kurtosis and
skewness values for the EF task dependent measures. Due to
computer program malfunctions, some participants (N = 7)
did not have scores for speciﬁc EF tasks. EM substitution
was carried out in order to treat missing data since each of
these participants only had missing scores for one particular
task. Reliability for all measures was assessed using Cronbach’s
alpha and was adequate for all except the Stop Signal task.
Correlations among the variables were consistent with previous
studies (Miyake et al., 2000; Friedman et al., 2006, 2008; Del
Missier et al., 2010). Descriptive statistics, correlation analyses,
reliability analyses, and EM substitution were all carried out
using SPSS 20 (IBM corp, 2011). Measurement models, structural
models and mediation analyses were conducted in AMOS 22
(Arbuckle, 2013).
Measurement Models
Mindfulness
The two factor model of the FFMQ-SF using sub-scales of non-
reactivity and observing indicated good model ﬁt. The chi-square
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics and correlations for mindfulness, executive functions, and critical thinking1.
M SD α2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Non-reactivity 14.01 3.13 0.72 1
2. Observing 13.35 2.96 0.71 0.09 1
3. Tone monitoring 0.29 0.25 0.86 0.14 0.24∗∗ 1
4. Stop signal 0.76 0.17 0.55 0.00 0.12 0.25∗∗ 1
5. Plus–minus 0.67 0.32 0.96 0.02 0.06 0.35∗∗ 0.09 1
6. Number–letter 0.91 0.13 0.95 −0.08 0.07 0.28∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 1
7. Letter memory 0.66 0.18 0.75 −0.04 −0.05 0.17∗ 0.08 0.12 0.06 1
8. Anti-saccade 0.86 0.13 0.91 −0.09 0.12 0.42∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.26∗∗ −0.05 1
9. Critical thinking 107.53 16.51 0.79 −0.12 0.14 0.20∗∗ 0.14 0.31∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.09 0.24∗∗ 1
1Mean and standard deviation for untransformed variables are presented while correlations presented are between transformed variables (∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01).
2Cronbach’s alpha.
test was non-signiﬁcant (33.12, p = 0.16) with TLI (0.97), IFI
(0.98) and CFI (0.98) values all above 0.95 and a RMSEA value
of 0.04 [0.00 −0.08]. Furthermore, all factor loadings ranged
between 0.46 and 0.85. Notably, it was a much better ﬁt than a
one factor model for which the chi-square test was signiﬁcant
(200.161, p < 0.001), the TLI (0.22), IFI (0.43) and CFI (0.42)
values were all below 0.45 and the RMSEA value was above 0.08
(0.19 [0.00 −0.08]).
Executive Function
Conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to compare models
with one, two, three or no related factors. This was done by
ﬁrst testing the full three-factor model and then testing the
alternative models nested within the full model, achieved by
ﬁxing speciﬁc correlations among the latent variables in the
following ways – for the one factor models, all correlations
were ﬁxed to 1.0, for the two factor models, the correlation
between the various pairs of unitary latent variables was ﬁxed
to 1.0 while the other two were allowed to vary freely and
for the model with no relationships among the three factors
(i.e., independence), all correlations were ﬁxed to zero. It
was expected that the full three factor model would provide
the best ﬁt to the data. Of these possibilities, a nested
two factor model with the covariance between the Shifting
and Updating factors constrained to one provided the most
adequate ﬁt to the data. However, given the low factor
loadings of the Plus–Minus and Number–Letter tasks on the
Shifting factor, it was decided to drop the Shifting factor from
further analyses. The resulting model demonstrated adequate
ﬁt with a non-signiﬁcant chi-square test (3.83, p = 0.05),
and IFI and CFI values of 0.95 (although the TLI value
was an inadequate 0.67). This model had an AIC value of
21.83 and AIC values for the competing models were all
worse, ranging from 36.20 for the nested two factor model
described above to 124.23 for the three independent factors
model.
Structural Models
Executive Function and Critical Thinking
Following Miyake et al. (2000), this stage involved adding CT
performance as a manifest variable to the EF model supported
in the previous stage. Potential paths from the latent variables
to the CT manifest variable were evaluated. Models with either
two or one path(s) (i.e., paths from both inhibition and updating,
or paths from either inhibition or updating) to the CT manifest
variable were compared to determine the paths necessary to
provide the best ﬁt to the observed data. The two-path model ﬁt
the observed data best (see Table 2) and demonstrated a strong
signiﬁcant relationship between Updating and CT (β = 3.25,
p = 0.04). In order for this model and the one-path model
connecting Updating and CT to identify, the error variance of
CT was ﬁxed to 0.001. This is acceptable in cases where a model
will not identify due to negative error variance but the estimate
of negative error variance is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 0 (Dillon et al., 1987).
Mindfulness, Executive Function, and Critical
Thinking
This stage involved adding the Observing and Non-reactivity
facets of dispositional mindfulness as manifest variables to
the model supported in the previous stage. A model with
the hypothesized paths was compared against two reference
structural models with one assuming no relation between
both mindfulness facets and the three latent EF variables and
one assuming that each facet is related to each EF. For the
hypothesized model to be supported, it needed to demonstrate
a better ﬁt to the data than the model assuming no relations
and the ﬁt had to be no worse than the full path model. This
TABLE 2 | Fit indices for structural models of executive functions and critical thinking.
Model df χ2 p IFI CFI TLI RMSEA AIC
Two path model 4 4.98 0.29 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.04 [0.00 −0.13] 26.98
One Path – Inhibition 4 7.59 0.11 0.95 0.95 0.87 0.07 [0.00 −0.15] 29.59
One Path – Updating 5 41.02 0.00 0.52 0.49 −0.02 0.20 [0.15 −0.26] 61.02
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 2043
Noone et al. Mindfulness and Critical Thinking
TABLE 3 | Fit indices for structural models of mindfulness, executive functions, and critical thinking.
Model df χ2 p IFI CFI TLI RMSEA AIC
Hypothesized 8 13.62 0.09 0.94 0.93 0.82 0.06 [0.00 −0.12] 53.62
No paths 12 31.58 0.002 0.79 0.76 0.59 0.10 [0.06 −0.14] 63.58
Full path 7 13.52 0.06 0.93 0.92 0.76 0.07 [0.00 −0.13] 55.52
TABLE 4 | Estimates in the multiple mediation model.
Type of effect b SE β BC 95% CI p
Direct effects
Observing → Updating 0.44 0.53 0.04 [−0.33, 1.81] 0.26
Observing → Inhibition∗∗ 1.77 0.57 0.23 [0.65, 2.85] 0.001
Observing → Critical Thinking −0.06 1.17 −0.01 [−1.85, 1.30] 0.92
Non-reactivity → Inhibition 0.87 0.53 0.12 [−0.11, 2.01] 0.08
Non-reactivity → Critical Thinking∗ −0.91 0.58 −0.17 [−2.13, −0.07] 0.04
Updating → Critical Thinking∗∗∗ 0.82 0.61 1.47 [0.37, 2.40] 0.000
Inhibition → Critical Thinking∗∗ 0.31 0.60 0.43 [0.03, 1.69] 0.009
Specific indirect effects
Non-reactivity → Inhibition → Critical Thinking∗ 0.27 0.46 0.05 [0.01, 2.35] 0.04
Observing → Inhibition → Critical Thinking∗∗ 0.55 0.99 0.10 [0.04, 2.97] 0.009
Observing → Updating → Critical Thinking 0.36 0.57 0.07 [−0.31, 1.48] 0.25
Total indirect effects
Non-reactivity → Inhibition → Critical Thinking∗ 0.27 0.46 0.05 [0.01, 2.35] 0.04
Observing → Inhibition + Updating → Critical Thinking 0.91 1.14 0.16 [−0.22, 2.82] 0.12
Total effects
Non-reactivity → Inhibition → Critical Thinking −0.64 0.38 −0.12 [−1.40, 0.10] 0.09
Non-reactivity → Critical Thinking
Observing → Inhibition + Updating → Critical Thinking 0.85 0.42 0.15 [0.05, 1.69] 0.04
Observing → Critical Thinking∗
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
analysis strategy is similar to that employed by Del Missier
et al. (2010). To achieve the best possible ﬁt, the error variances
for the Tone Monitoring scores and the Letter Memory scores
respectively were allowed to co-vary with the error variance for
the Anti-saccade task, as suggested by the modiﬁcation indices.
Examination of the model ﬁt indices demonstrated that the
hypothesized model was supported (see Table 3). Parameter
estimates revealed a signiﬁcant positive relationship between
Observing and Inhibition and a weak but signiﬁcant negative
relationship between Non-reactivity and CT (see Table 4).
Multiple Mediation Model
In order to investigate whether the eﬀects of the Observing
and Non-reactivity facets of dispositional mindfulness on CT
were mediated by EF, a multiple mediation analysis (MacKinnon
et al., 2007) was carried out. Figure 1 displays the model
which was examined. The ﬁrst step in the multiple mediation
analysis involved quantifying the direct eﬀects of mindfulness
on both EF and CT respectively. More speciﬁcally, it required
examining the paths leading directly from the dispositional
mindfulness facets of Observing and Non-reactivity to the EF
latent variables, and from both the mindfulness and EF factors
to CT. Then the speciﬁc indirect eﬀects were quantiﬁed. Here
these are deﬁned as the eﬀects leading from a mindfulness
factor via each EF factor to CT. Following this, the total
indirect eﬀects were calculated by summing the speciﬁc indirect
eﬀects. Lastly, the direct eﬀect of each mindfulness factor (i.e.,
Observing and Non-reactivity respectively) on CT and their
corresponding speciﬁc indirect eﬀect were summed to ﬁnd the
total eﬀects. These eﬀects were estimated, along with their 95%
conﬁdence intervals (CIs), using bias corrected bootstrapping
with 5,000 draws speciﬁed, as recommended (see Table 4; Kline,
2011).
The diﬀerent patterns of mediation/non-mediation present
can be described using an approach developed by Zhao et al.
(2010). The signiﬁcance of both the indirect and direct eﬀects
were examined to determine whether meditation is present and,
if it was, whether it was complementary (where both indirect
and direct eﬀects are signiﬁcant and the multiplication of their
estimates is positive), competitive (where both indirect and direct
eﬀects are signiﬁcant and the multiplication of their estimates is
negative) or indirect only [where there is no signiﬁcant direct
eﬀect but the indirect eﬀects is signiﬁcant – full mediation in
Baron and Kenny’s (1986) terms]. It was found that for the
path leading from Non-Reactivity to CT through Inhibition that
there was evidence for competitive mediation since the direct
eﬀect of Non-Reactivity on CT was signiﬁcant but negative
while its speciﬁc indirect eﬀect through Inhibition was signiﬁcant
and positive. For the path from Observing to CT through
Inhibition, evidence for indirect-only mediation was present as
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FIGURE 1 | Multiple mediation model of mindfulness facets, executive functions, and critical thinking with standardized direct effects and 95%
confidence intervals (CIs), using bias corrected bootstrapping for indirect effects. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
this speciﬁc indirect path was signiﬁcant and positive but the
direct path from Observing to CT was not signiﬁcant. Since
the indirect path from Observing to CT through Updating
was not signiﬁcant either, Updating cannot be considered a
mediator of the relationship between Observing and CT in
this model. Overall, the model explained 36.3% of the variance
in CT. There was no diﬀerence in strength between the two
signiﬁcant speciﬁc indirect eﬀects observed which indicates
that they both aﬀect CT performance to a similar extent
(p = 0.22).
DISCUSSION
This study sought to investigate the claim that higher
dispositional mindfulness facilitates CT performance. This claim
was based on previous research on the cognitive beneﬁts of
mindfulness and the self-regulation of higher-order cognition
more generally and insights from the Default Interventionist
theory of Hisgher-order Cognition. Furthermore, this study
aimed to examine whether EF performance operates as a
mechanism through which mindfulness facilitates CT. Relations
between the observing and non-reactivity facets of mindfulness,
the EF processes of updating, shifting and inhibition, and CT
performance were examined using SEM. This analysis revealed
a number of interesting ﬁndings in relation to the speciﬁed
hypotheses.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis stated that the two-component model
of mindfulness would be found to be a better ﬁt than a one-
factor solution. This conceptualisation made use of the observing
and non-reactivity subscales of the Five Factor Mindfulness
Questionnaire. These sub-scales represent the most supported
operational deﬁnition of mindfulness and have been found
to have dissociable cognitive correlates (Anicha et al., 2011).
Consistent with our ﬁrst hypothesis, the two-component model
of mindfulness was supported and used in the subsequent SEMs.
Our second hypothesis concerned the structure of EF.
Speciﬁcally, consistent with Miyake et al. (2000) unity and
diversity model of EF and subsequent research supporting this
(Del Missier et al., 2010; Miyake and Friedman, 2012), it was
hypothesized that the measurement model for EF would support
a three-factor model structure which proposes that updating,
inhibition, and shifting are related but distinct components of
EF. EF was assessed using a battery of tasks measuring the skills
of updating, inhibition and switching to which a latent variable
analysis was applied. A two-factor solution was found to be
optimal in the current study, with the updating and inhibition
factors retained as the inclusion of the shifting tasks led to
problems in identifying a positive deﬁnite covariance matrix. This
could be due to the ceiling eﬀects found for these tasks in the
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 2043
Noone et al. Mindfulness and Critical Thinking
current sample. Factor loadings were in the range reported in
previous studies (Miyake et al., 2000; Del Missier et al., 2010).
The third hypothesis focused on the direct eﬀects of
mindfulness on CT. It was expected that both observing and non-
reactivity would be positively related to CT. Results indicated
no direct eﬀect of observing on CT. However, there was a
positive, indirect eﬀect of observing on CT that was mediated
by inhibition, suggesting that observing inﬂuences EF which in
turn inﬂuences CT ability. This indirect eﬀect is discussed in
more detail below in regard to our ﬁnal hypothesis. Converse
to our hypotheses, non-reactivity was found to be signiﬁcantly
negatively related to CT. This is an interesting ﬁnding which
suggests the possible existence of mediators not accounted for
by the model which may have a debilitative eﬀect on CT
performance. Potential candidates include worry and repetitive
thought, emotional regulation and positive mood, and non-
elaborative processing. For example, mindfulness has been shown
to reduce habitual worry and evidence suggests that a key
mechanism underlying this is the negative relationship between
non-reactivity and repetitive thought (Evans and Segerstrom,
2011). Furthermore, responsibility to continue thinking, a
process underlying habitual worry, has been shown to be
important for eﬀective CT (Sugiura, 2013). It is possible that
in reducing repetitive thought and worry, non-reactivity could
indirectly impair CT performance. Similarly, as regards the
possible role of emotional regulation, non-reactivity is thought
to require executive control to inhibit the elaboration of acute
aﬀective cues (Teper et al., 2013), and this has been shown to
result in the down-regulation of negative aﬀect and increases
in positive aﬀect (Chambers et al., 2009). However, this pattern
of emotional regulation may result in sub-optimal conditions
for CT performance since negative aﬀect tends to facilitate the
engagement of EF and positive aﬀect increases the probability of
intuitive thinking (Bolte et al., 2003; Fiedler et al., 2003; Teper
et al., 2013; Inzlicht et al., 2015). It is also possible that the
measure of non-reactivity used in the current study captures
a tendency for non-elaborative processing beyond just aﬀective
cues. The questionnaire items used to assess non-reactivity
focus on the ability to “let go” soon after the experience of
distressing thoughts, rather than persisting with the thoughts.
This dispositional tendency may lead to less cognitive eﬀort being
engaged when thinking in stressful, problem situations, which
a test such as the Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment could
be considered to be. Cognitive eﬀort is vital for eﬀective CT
performance (Stanovich, 2011) and it is possible that high levels
of non-reactivity are associated with low levels of cognitive eﬀort
in some situations. It is possible that any one of these factors, or
a combination, could account for the negative relationship found
between non-reactivity and CT in the current study. However,
further research is needed to replicate the ﬁndings observed
in the current study and examine these and other explanatory
mechanisms in more detail.
Our fourth hypothesis speciﬁed direct relations between
observing and the EF components. It was expected that observing
would be positively related to updating, inhibition, and shifting.
Observing was not found to predict updating in the current
study, and it was not correlated with shifting performance,
but observing did predict inhibition as hypothesized. Much
previous research has linked mindfulness skill with enhanced
inhibition (Heeren et al., 2009; Sahdra et al., 2011; Greenberg
et al., 2012b). Predictions of a link between observing and
inhibition were based on process descriptions of mindfulness,
which emphasize the inhibition of elaborative processing in
order to keep one’s attention focused on observing the present-
moment (Bishop et al., 2004). This is an important ﬁnding as
the proposed relationship between mindfulness and inhibition is
often invoked in explaining how mindfulness disrupts automatic
thinking across studies of the outcomes of mindfulness (e.g.,
Frewen et al., 2007; Kang et al., 2012; Ostaﬁn and Kassman, 2012;
Ostaﬁn et al., 2013a). Studies have also suggested the beneﬁts
of mindfulness practice for working memory operation and the
link between observing and working memory updating has been
theorized previously (Jha et al., 2010; Anicha et al., 2011; van
Vugt and Jha, 2011; Mrazek et al., 2013). The lack of a direct
relationship between observing and updating in the current
study may reﬂect the approach the study adopted. Most studies
focusing on the eﬀects of mindfulness on working memory
have involved training interventions and the only ﬁnding of a
positive relationship between observing and working memory
updating from a dispositional perspective may have been due to
perceptual rather than executive beneﬁts (Anicha et al., 2011). It
is possible that speciﬁc mindfulness training is required in order
for individual diﬀerences in working memory updating to emerge
in relation to skills in observing.
The ﬁfth hypothesis, concerning the relationship between
non-reactivity and inhibition was not supported, contrary to
previous ﬁndings from mindfulness training studies (Anicha
et al., 2011; Teper et al., 2013). Regarding the relationship
between non-reactivity and shifting, no signiﬁcant relationships
were observed. It is surprising to ﬁnd no direct eﬀects of non-
reactivity on any component of EF since the engagement of
executive control to suppress the elaboration of aﬀective cues is
considered to be central to non-reactive information processing
(Teper and Inzlicht, 2013). However, a recent study found a
signiﬁcant but small negative eﬀect of non-reactivity on self-
reported behavior regulation, which includes items related to
inhibition and shifting (Short et al., 2015). Non-reactivity skills
have been shown to take longer to develop than observing skills
in training studies (Lilja et al., 2012) and perhaps more explicit
guidance and practice are needed to demonstrate signiﬁcant links
between non-reactivity and EF. Furthermore, the self-report of
non-reactivity outside of mindfulness training contexts may be
diﬀerent to the self-report of this ability after some exposure to
mindfulness practices, and thus relations between mindfulness
dispositions and EF may diﬀer across diﬀerent study contexts
(Van Dam et al., 2009).
Our sixth hypothesis stated that the EF components would
each exert signiﬁcant direct, positive eﬀects on CT. Consistent
with our hypothesis, both updating and inhibition were
signiﬁcantly and positively associated with CT in the ﬁnal SEM
model. The eﬀect of updating on CT was stronger than that of
inhibition. One possible explanation for this pattern of ﬁndings
is that updating is more important for sustained high level
performance on the Halpern task. For instance, once the initial
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intuitive response to a situation in the Halpern Critical Thinking
Assessment is inhibited, updating is continuously engaged as
the contents of working memory are manipulated and revised
and as more information is gleaned from the question. Another
possibility is that the low reliability for the Stop Signal task
contributed to the weaker eﬀect of inhibition. Importantly, this
is the ﬁrst study to demonstrate a relationship between speciﬁc
EFs and CT performance. This ﬁnding aligns with previous
research suggesting the importance of working memory for
eﬀective CT (Dwyer et al., 2014) and is in line with the Default
Interventionist theory which emphasizes the necessity of working
memory operations for Type 2 processes such as CT (Evans and
Stanovich, 2013).
Finally, it was hypothesized that the relationship between
mindfulness and CT would be mediated by EF. Using SEM
to conduct a multiple mediation analysis, it was found that
there was evidence for inhibition mediating the relationships
between CT and both observing and non-reactivity. The
relationship between observing, inhibition and CT is considered
to be indirect-only mediation [or full mediation in Baron
and Kenny’s (1986) terms] since no direct eﬀect of observing
on CT was found. This ﬁnding suggests that the entirety of
the eﬀect of present-moment mindful observation on CT is
due to it being positively related to inhibition. Evidence for
competitive mediation was found for the relationship between
non-reactivity, inhibition, and mindfulness. This means that
while there was a negative direct eﬀect of non-reactivity on
CT, there was a positive indirect eﬀect of non-reactivity on
CT that was mediated by inhibition. This positive indirect
eﬀect makes sense considering the fact that non-reactivity has
been assumed to reduce automatic responding and promote
more reﬂective responses (Peters et al., 2015). This competitive
relationship suggests the presence of additional mediators not
accounted for by the model, as discussed above, which act
independently of the positive indirect relationship (Zhao et al.,
2010). The observation that inhibition acts as a mediator
of both components of mindfulness in this model provides
evidence for inhibition as a core mechanism of the eﬀect
of mindfulness on CT. This mechanism has been suggested
in several previous studies showing facilitative eﬀects of
mindfulness on higher-order cognition (Cottone and Javier,
2007; Ruedy and Schweitzer, 2011; Ostaﬁn et al., 2013b; Wen
et al., 2013) but has never been explicitly demonstrated before.
This ﬁnding ties the relationship between mindfulness, EF,
and CT closely to the Default Interventionist Dual Process
Theory of Higher-order Cognition which posits that it is
through the inhibition of the prepotent tendency to accept
the outcomes of Type 1 processes that Type 2 higher-order
cognitive processes such as CT are engaged (Stanovich and
Toplak, 2012).
This study had several strengths. Methodologically speaking,
it employed objective behavioral measures of both EF and
CT. It had a relatively large sample size to allow for the
reliable identiﬁcation of eﬀects using SEM (Soper, 2015). The
use of SEM also accounted for the task impurity problem
in the measurement of EF and allowed multiple mediation
to be examined. While previous research has suggested that
mindfulness can facilitate higher-order thinking skills in general,
its eﬀect on CT speciﬁcally had not been examined and no
attempts had been made to identify the mechanisms driving
this relationship. This study also sheds light on the extent to
which particular executive processes are implicated in CT. By
identifying links between literature on mindfulness and self-
regulation, and studies on the self-regulation of higher-order
cognition it was hypothesized that EF would mediate the eﬀect
of mindfulness on CT. Consistent with Evans and Stanovich’s
(2013) default interventionist dual process theory of higher-
order cognition, it appears that mindfulness may be enabling
the engagement of Type-2 processing as a result of its positive
eﬀects on EF, particularly inhibition. This study adds to the
very few studies that have focused on the eﬀects of dispositional
mindfulness in psychologically healthy individuals (Petrocchi
and Ottaviani, 2015) and increases our knowledge regarding
the mechanisms by which mindfulness enhances higher-order
cognition.
However, there are some weaknesses to this study. As
with any cross-sectional study, caution must be taken in
interpreting these ﬁndings as causal. However, as the model
ﬁt was good, the hypothesized causal relations can be said
to be plausible (Bollen and Pearl, 2013) and can be used
as the basis for further experimental work that examines
causal hypotheses in controlled settings. The use of a self-
report measure to assess dispositional mindfulness and the
use of non-practitioners of mindfulness mean that further
research is needed before the results of the current study can
be generalized to the practice of mindfulness. Furthermore,
debate continues regarding the validity of self-report measures
of dispositional mindfulness. While investigations involving
the FFMQ suggest that the non-reactivity facet represents
its corresponding aspect of mindfulness well, divergent views
exist regarding how best to measure the present-moment
attention aspect with some studies supporting the acting
with awareness facet (Rau and Williams, 2015) and others
supporting the observing facet (Anicha et al., 2011). It
is clear that further reﬁnement of the FFMQ is required
to increase its validity (Petrocchi and Ottaviani, 2015). As
regards the measurement of EF, despite adequate piloting
a number of participants did not understand the switching
task, while others found it too easy which produced a
ceiling eﬀect. This led to low factor loadings on the shifting
factor and much better ﬁt when this factor was dropped,
thus not supporting the common conceptualisation of the
unity/diversity model of EF. Any Speed-Accuracy Trade-Oﬀ
advantage, sometimes observed in more mindful individuals
(van Vugt and Jha, 2011), would not have been captured
by the proportional accuracy dependent variables employed
here. However, this has only been observed in individuals
trained in mindfulness and thus may not have had an
eﬀect in the current study. Finally, the measures of EF we
employed were purely performance based. It has been suggested
that including both self-reported measures of EF and self-
regulation and performance-based measures is important for
increasing ecological validity (Toplak et al., 2013). Future
investigations could include measures such as the Behavior
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Rating Inventory of Executive Functions which has been shown
recently to mediate the relationship between mindfulness and
both positive and negative aﬀect independently of and to a greater
extent than performance-based EF tasks (Short et al., 2015).
In summary, dispositional mindfulness appears to facilitate,
albeit weakly, CT performance and this eﬀect is mediated by
the inhibition component of EF. However, this relationship
is complex as the non-reactivity facet of mindfulness appears
to have a competing negative eﬀect on CT through as yet
unidentiﬁed mediators. These ﬁndings suggest many possibilities
for future research. In order to support the claim that
mindfulness can improve CT in educational settings (Shapiro
et al., 2011), careful intervention research will be needed.
Applying experimental designs to this research in both short-
term lab settings and longer-term intervention contexts will be
useful in learning more about the developmental trajectory of
the relationship between mindfulness and CT and in identifying
relevant mediators other than EF. Further focus on the role
of EFs is important but additional mediators are likely and
must be investigated. It would certainly be interesting to
compare current CT instructional courses with similar courses
infused with mindfulness lessons (e.g., Bush, 2011). However,
it is important to ﬁrst continue investigations of the basic
relationships between mindfulness and higher-order cognitive
skills in typically developing individuals and the mechanisms
underlying any signiﬁcant relationships found.
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